The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error

Joel Smith
University of Manchester

Abstract
I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of 'we' and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.

Keywords
First-person plural, immunity to error, indexicals.

1 Introduction
Language and thought can be first-personal. That is, one can utter the words 'I' or 'me', and one can employ the first-person concept I in one's thinking. First-person knowledge of ourselves, in particular knowledge of our own mental states, is special in a way that third-personal knowledge of ourselves is not. Self-knowledge is, in some cases, immediate, or groundless, and privileged. Other things being equal, if I have a headache, want a bath, or believe that P, then I know that I have a headache, want a bath, or believe that P. But I need not believe these things to be true of NN, even if I am NN. For the latter, I would have to take it that I am NN. But there is no corresponding need to believe that I am me. Or, if preferred, this isn't something that anyone could meaningfully doubt. We can put this by saying that certain ways of gaining information about oneself, centrally but not

1 I use 'single quotes' for names of words, sentences, and utterances. I use underlining for names of concepts and thought contents.
necessarily exclusively about the state of one’s mind, feed directly into one’s first-personal conception of oneself. As a consequence, a certain type of error is excluded: it cannot be the case that I know, via introspection, that somebody has a headache, wants a bath, or believes that P, yet mistakenly think that it is me. Such judgements, that is, are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person pronoun (Shoemaker 1970, Evans 1982, Prosser and Recanati 2012). Such IEM is one central element in the first-person perspective: a perspective from which one speaks, thinks, and experiences first-personally.

Language and thought can be first-personal in both the singular and the plural. That is, one can not only utter ‘I’ or ‘me’, but also ‘we’ and ‘us’, and one can employ the first-person plural concept we in one’s thinking. Is first-person plural knowledge of ourselves special in a way that third-person plural knowledge of ourselves is not? In particular, are there ways of gaining knowledge of us that feed directly into one’s first-person plural thinking? Are there any thoughts of which it cannot be the case that I know that some group, g, is F yet mistakenly think that g is us? Otherwise put, are any judgements immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person plural pronoun? An answer to this question will tell us something about the prospects for articulating a first-person plural perspective: a perspective from which one speaks, or thinks, plural first-personally.

Determining whether some we-thought is IEM requires us to say something about the first-person plural pronoun itself. This I do in §2, where I defend a novel account of the semantics of ‘we’. This prepares the ground for the discussion of IEM relative to ‘we’ in §§3 and 4, in which I defend the claim that a certain range of we-thoughts are IEM.

2 The meaning of ‘we’

What does the word ‘we’ mean? As the plural counterpart of ‘I’ one might reasonably expect an answer to this question to draw on the extensive literature on that term. An obvious starting point here is
Kaplan’s theory of indexicals. Two distinctions are central to this account: that between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation, and that between content and character.

On Kaplan’s (1989b) account, ‘I’, like other indexicals, is a directly referential term. The individual relevant to determining the truth of a sentence of the form ‘I am F’ is given by the context of utterance, not the circumstance of evaluation. Thus, we can ask whether what Yi Ling has said with her true utterance, at time t in location l, of ‘I am dancing’, would have been true in a circumstance in which Yi Ling herself was not dancing but a non-stop dancer was located at l at t. The answer is negative for the reason that the person to whom we should look to evaluate for truth is not whoever happens to be located at l at t, but rather the person who actually made the utterance, Yi Ling. In this, of course, ‘I’ differs from definite descriptions. If Yi Ling, alone in her room, says, ‘the tallest person in the room is dancing’, then we look to Yi Ling to determine truth. If we want to know whether what she has said would have been true in a room containing both her and the taller Menaha, then we look to Menaha. For indexical terms, this distinction between context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation is crucial.

The phrase, ‘what is said’, used in the previous paragraph, concerns the content of an utterance. But content is only one of a pair of notions required to understand the meaning of indexicals. While the content of Yi Ling’s utterance of ‘I’ is simply Yi Ling, that does not fully characterise the meaning of the first-person pronoun. For, if it did, that word would have as many meanings (or there would be as many homophonic words) as there were persons uttering it. What is required, in addition to content, is Kaplan’s notion of character. The character of a term is that which fixes its referent. In the case of ‘I’, the referent is fixed by the simple rule: ‘I’ refers to the person who utters it. According to Kaplan, this rule, plus the fact that it is directly referential, gives the meaning of the word ‘I’.

Whilst I present the account of ‘I’ and ‘we’ using Kaplan’s terminology, I assume that the Neo-Fregean picture, with its focus on what Peacocke calls ‘fundamental reference rules’, can similarly account for all the facts. See Evans 1981, and Peacocke 2008. I also take the essential aspects of my account to be consistent with Nunberg’s (1993) three-way distinction between deictic, classificatory and relational components of indexical meaning.
is not, however, synonymous with ‘I’ since it is not itself directly referential. The character of ‘I’, as given by the simple rule, marks out the first-person pronoun as what Kaplan calls a ‘pure’ indexical. That is, ‘I’ is an indexical that does not require any accompanying demonstration or referential intention in order for its referent to be fixed. In this respect it differs from demonstrative indexicals such as ‘this’, ‘that’, or ‘she’, the character of which involves a demonstration or referential intention.

What should we say about the first-person pronoun’s plural counterpart? It is clearly an indexical, requiring some contextual element to complete it. But, in light of the above we can ask three questions: Is ‘we’ directly referential? Is ‘we’ a pure indexical? What is the character of ‘we’? The first thing to say, in the face of these questions is that unlike ‘I’ or, more cautiously, more obviously than in the case of ‘I’, there are a variety of uses of ‘we’. Putting to one side the majestic plural, we can distinguish between inclusive and exclusive uses of ‘we’. Thus, an utterance of ‘we are winning’ can either include or pointedly exclude the interlocutor (i.e. ‘We are winning, but you are not!’). This distinction, whilst of great pragmatic importance, is not our primary concern. It does, however, make clear something that is: that in the case of ‘we’ there is no simple rule determining the referent. In this respect, ‘we’ differs sharply from ‘I’. Whilst the referent of a token of ‘I’ is always a single individual, the person that utters it, the referent of ‘we’ is always a group or plurality of individuals. There is, however, great flexibility on the identity of that group. In my mouth, ‘we’ may pick out my family, my co-workers, my fellow citizens, or all of humanity. ‘We’, it seems, can pick out any group of which I am a member.

---

3 For an earlier account of indexicals that recognises something akin to the content/character distinction, see Husserl 1900.

4 For the social and political significance of this and related uses of ‘we’, see the papers collected in Pavlidou 2014.

5 Nunberg (1993) denies that ‘I’ can only refer to single individuals, citing cases in which it appears to pick out types of individuals. I leave his view of ‘I’ aside here since it does not affect what I say about ‘we’ which is broadly in line with Nunberg’s own account.

6 I put aside issues that arise regarding the notion of plural reference. My use
Such flexibility is also a feature of the demonstrative use of ‘they’? They can be the neighbours, the Dutch, or the extra-terrestrials. This similarity, and the fact that ‘we’ will only ever refer to a group of which the speaker is a member, might suggest that ‘we’ can be analysed as ‘she/he/them + me’. On such a view, the plural first-person pronoun would be complex, incorporating both a pure indexical element, ‘I’, and a demonstrative element, ‘she/he/they’. This does, I think, capture a central use of ‘we’. But there is another that has not yet been mentioned. For the demonstrative use of ‘they’ requires, as do demonstratives quite generally, some form of acquaintance with the demonstratum. ‘They’, in its demonstrative use, as the plural of ‘she/he’, requires the speaker to be presented with the persons to whom she refers. This, perhaps, is what is said when, under my breath, I mutter, ‘We must be crazy’, in a crowded underground train. In this case, we are myself plus these people with whom I am slowly suffocating. But this is not, plausibly, what is said by the preacher’s ‘we are gathered here today’. In this case, the group is being addressed. The preacher’s ‘we’ is not ‘she/he/them + me’ but rather ‘you(s) + me’. These two uses of ‘we’, ‘she/he/they + me’ and ‘you(s) + me’, do not exhaust the uses with which we are concerned, however. For it is entirely possible for ‘we’ to pick out some group the members of which are neither presented to nor addressed by me. There are two cases, one involving definite descriptions, the other names. As an example of the first, during a diatribe against minor injustices of the phrase ‘group or plurality’ is intended to be maximally liberal as to what the referents of such terms might be. For a helpful discussion of plural reference, see Oliver and Smiley 2013.

7 The demonstrative use of ‘they’ is to be contrasted with both the anaphoric use (as in ‘Jack and Jill went up the hill. They fetched a pail of water’) and what we might call the Heideggerian use (as in ‘They say it takes two to tango’).

8 Plausibly ‘she’ should be analysed as either ‘this woman’, or ‘this female’. See Corazza 2002 for discussion. There are complications arising from the fact that this is a complex demonstrative to which I will briefly return in §3.

9 I use ‘yous’ as the plural form of ‘you’.

10 This is, of course, also true of ‘she/he/they’, but such uses are anaphoric. Not so in the case of ‘we’.
suffered by glasses wearers I might complain ‘we are sometimes called ‘speccy four-eyes’’. Here, ‘we’ is picking out that group identified by the definite description ‘the persons who wear glasses’. As an example of the second, in a conversation about Barak Obama, I might suggest ‘we have a great deal in common’, despite my never having been acquainted with, never having addressed, not knowing any individuating descriptions of, and in fact having little in common with the former US President.\footnote{It might be argued that such examples may be treated as ‘them + me’ and ‘him + me’, with ‘them’ and ‘him’ understood as anaphorical on the relevant description or proper name that has occurred earlier in the conversation. This, if true, would be of no great significance for present purposes, since descriptions and names still get into the act in a way that they do not for the demonstrative and interlocutive uses. As such, I will ignore this possibility in what follows.}

There are, then, at least four uses of ‘we’: ‘she/he/they + me’, ‘you(s) + me’, ‘the $F$ person(s) + me’, and ‘$NN_1$, $NN_2$, $NN_3$, \ldots + me’.\footnote{From these four, further combinations can be formulated, for example ‘$A$, she, + me’. I leave these aside, focussing on the four simpler cases. I use ‘the $F$ person(s)’ for the descriptive case despite the fact that it is possible to refer to non-persons with ‘we’. One can, for example, refer to oneself, one’s guinea pig, and one’s android, as ‘we’. For simplicity of formulation, I treat ‘persons’ as capable of referring to all animate entities.} I will refer to these respectively as the demonstrative, interlocutive, descriptive, and naming, uses. Does this plurality of uses mean that ‘we’ is ambiguous or, more plausibly, polysemous? Vallée (1996) claims that it is. But a univocal account of ‘we’ would be preferable and such an account can be given. The different uses of ‘we’, rather than corresponding to different meanings, represent different ways in which a single lexical meaning can be supplemented by the speaker’s referential intentions. In this respect, ‘we’ is similar to both ‘here’ and ‘now’.

Kaplan (1989b: 491.) suggests that ‘here’ and ‘now’ are pure indexicals. That is, their characters—which can be thought of as the place of utterance and the time of utterance, respectively—fix the referent without the need of demonstration or referential intention. But this is not correct.\footnote{As Kaplan himself seems to recognise but without drawing the obvious inference (Kaplan 1989b). Also see Perry 2001.} An utterance made at $l$ is also made at any
location of which \( l \) is a sub-region. So, uttering ‘it is hot here now’ whilst standing in Essaouira, ‘here’ might refer to the particular spot in which I am standing, the whole city, Morocco, the Maghreb, and so on. Similarly, ‘now’ might refer to the hour, the season, the epoch, and so on. What determines which of these things is being said? The description the place and time of utterance will not do it. Intention, however, can perform this role.\(^{14}\) Of course, the referent of ‘here’ must be a place of utterance, but which place that is is made determinate by my intention to refer, say, to the Maghreb. The same seems to be true of ‘now’. Whilst ‘now’ must refer to a time of utterance, which time that is is made determinate by my intention to refer to, say, the season. In this case, ‘it is hot here now’ has the same content as ‘it is hot in the Maghreb this summer’ (of course, these utterances have different characters).

We should understand ‘we’ on this model. Thus, we cannot think of the reference of ‘we’ as determined by the simple description the group or plurality of animate entities of which the producer of this token is a member for I am a member of many groups. We should, rather, think of the character of ‘we’ as something like the intended group or plurality of animate entities of which the producer of this token is a member, where this requires supplementation by a referential intention on the part of the speaker.\(^{15}\) What makes it the case that my utterance of ‘we’ refers to my family rather than to my colleagues or any other plurality of which I am a member, is that I intend it to do so. Of course, sometimes an utterance of ‘we’, like ‘here’, is accompanied by a demonstration intended to indicate the referent, but this need not be so and I will continue to take as paradigmatic the case where it does not.

Vallée considers and rejects a similar suggestion: that the character of ‘we’ is ‘the speaker and some individuals that speaker focuses his intention on’ (1996: 223). But his arguments are less than compelling. For example, he claims that there is one reading of ‘Mary plays violin. We sometimes play duets’ according to which the reference of ‘we’ is, in part, fixed by the prior utterance of ‘Mary’, and

\(^{14}\) These will be ‘directing intentions’ in the sense of Kaplan (1989a).

\(^{15}\) Cf. Nunberg (1993: 8), who suggests ‘the group of people including the speaker’ which, as he goes on to point out, can only be determined by taking into account ‘the speakers intentions, conversational purposes, and linguistic context’ (1993:10).
that this cannot be accounted for on the current proposal. But, actually, the fact that this is only one reading of the utterance (after all, 'we' can be read as referring to myself and a third, unnamed person) shows that intention is required. The reading that Vallée points out can be seen as the result of the intention to refer to the previously mentioned individual, i.e. Mary.\textsuperscript{16}

The fact that the character of 'we' requires supplementation by way of a referential intention allows a univocal account to accommodate the various uses of 'we'. For the intention in question can be demonstrative, interlocutive, descriptive, or naming. That is, with my utterance of 'we' I can intend to pick out \textit{myself and her/them}, \textit{myself and you(s)}, \textit{myself and the F people}, or \textit{myself and NN}. That is, the variety of uses of 'we' is a consequence of the variety of intentions that can supplement the character. With this in mind, I will continue to speak of the different uses of 'we', with no suggestion that the term is polysemous. I will also speak of the components of 'we', which are 'I' and the relevant terms employed in the referential intention: \textit{her/them}, \textit{you(s)}, \textit{the F people}, \textit{NN}.

This puts us in a position to answer our three questions: What is the character of 'we'? Is 'we' a pure indexical? Is 'we' directly referential? I have already given the character of 'we' as the \textit{intended group or plurality of animate entities of which the producer of this token is a member}. Since this requires a supplementing intention, and a pure indexical is one that requires no accompanying demonstration or referential intention to fix reference, it follows that 'we' is not a pure indexical. Is 'we' directly referential? Not per se, but there are directly referential uses. Insofar as 'I' is directly referential, 'we' will always contain a directly referential component. But whilst 'you + me' is arguably wholly directly referential, 'the F person(s) + me' is certainly not.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} For further critical discussion of Vallée, see Korta 2016, who defends a different univocal account. His own proposal for the character of 'we' is 'the speaker of the utterance and some other animated individual(s) the speaker is referring to'. But this won't work. Character is supposed to fix reference, so cannot presuppose it.

\textsuperscript{17} This feature of being partly, though not wholly, directly referential, is not unique to such uses of 'we'. Consider, for example, 'The philosopher I met in Marrakech'.
The central point is that the correct semantic theory of ‘we’ will be parasitic on the correct semantic theory for ‘I’, on the one hand, and the semantics for complex demonstratives, definite descriptions, and names, on the other. A recognition of this point, alongside the variety of uses, as rudimentary as it is, is all that we require for an initial investigation of the first-person plural and immunity to error.

3 We-thought and immunity to error

Just as the first-person singular term, ‘I’, has an analogue in thought, the first-person singular concept, I, so the first-person plural term, ‘we’, has an analogue in thought, the first-person concept, we. Thought that employs we can do so in each of its four uses. Given the possibility of thinking in the first-person plural, it can be asked which features we-thought shares with the first-person singular. In the present context we can ask whether any we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification.

Whilst there is a great deal of work on the question of whether and under what conditions I-thoughts, here-thoughts, now-thoughts, and this-thoughts are IEM, the case of we-thoughts has been somewhat neglected. The only discussions of which I am aware are Bratman 18

Given the analysis of the first-person plural proposed in §2, one might question the rationale for positing a first-person plural concept in addition to the simpler concepts I, she/he/they, and you. The remarks on joint action below go some way to providing such a rationale. Additionally, the posulation of a distinctive first-person plural concept enables us to see what the variety of uses has in common: each is a way of thinking of a group as one to which one belongs. Put another way, there is a clear reference rule for the concept, albeit one that requires supplementation by guiding intention. This, it seems to me, is sufficient to show that the burden of proof is on someone who denies that there is such a concept.

19 There is one case the cogency of which might reasonably be doubted: the interlocutive case. For one’s thoughts, it is natural to suppose, lack an addressee. In this case, however, all that is required is that I can have in mind an imagined interlocutor; someone to whom my thought is imaginatively addressed. In this case, I can think you are going to get us killed, where the reference of us is partly determined by the intention to refer to you. This minimal notion is perfectly coherent and, as such, I will continue to speak, perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, of interlocutive thoughts. Nothing much hangs on this though. The possibility of a more robust notion second-personal thought is discussed in Salje 2017.
(2014: 58–9) and Schmid (2016, 2018), both of whom doubt that we-thoughts are (or can be) IEM. Schmid, for example, writes that ‘any plural version of such attitudes [e.g. intention and belief], however, does leave ample room for mis-identification’ (2016: 61). However, in the terms of the present paper, it is unclear what use of we either Schmid or Bratman have in mind and so not clear how to interpret this scepticism, i.e. as the either the claim that IEM is ruled out for all uses of we or that it is ruled out for just some uses.

My judgement ‘I am F’ involves an error of misidentification just in case I know of a that it is F, mistakenly believe that I am a, and thus judge myself to be F. Or, at least, this is the standard, de re, formulation. An alternative formulation has it that ‘I am F’ involves an error of misidentification just in case I know that something is F, mistakenly believe myself to be that thing, and thus judge myself to be F.20 Either way, a judgement will be immune to errors of misidentification relative to the grounds on which it is based. Suppose that I judge, on the usual introspective grounds, that I want a bath. It is natural to suppose that it cannot be the case that I know, via introspection, of a that a wants a bath and mistakenly take myself to be a. Introspection is, of necessity, a way of coming to know my own condition, not that of others. The judgement is de re IEM. Likewise, it is natural to suppose that it cannot be the case that I know, via introspection, that someone wants a bath, and mistakenly take that person to be myself. The judgement is IEM on the alternative, non de re, formulation also. In short, coming to know, via introspection that someone, or that a, wants a bath is sufficient for coming to know that I do. Whilst introspection is not the only way in which IEM judgements can be grounded, it is certainly the least controversial.21

Suppose, on the other hand, that the same judgement is based on different grounds, perhaps I infer that I must want a bath, given that I’m so dirty and that, of course, all dirty people want baths. In this, admittedly odd, case the judgement is not IEM in either fashion. For

20 For a detailed discussion of these two varieties of misidentification, see Pryor 1999. Also see the papers collected in Prosser and Recanati 2012, and the recent discussion in García-Carpintero 2018.

it may be that my judgement that I am dirty is, unbeknownst to me, based on a misidentification. Catching sight of Tanishi’s face, I mistakenly judge that face to be mine. This grounds the judgement that I am dirty and so, in turn, grounds the judgement that I want a bath. Error has crept in here, whether with the misidentification I = a or the equally faulty I am the person with the dirty face. The point, an entirely familiar one, is that IEM is relative to grounds.

That some, but not all, I-thoughts are IEM is the standard view. But what of we-thoughts? Are any we-thoughts IEM, either de re or otherwise? In the case of the plural first-person pronoun, misidentification occurs when I mistakenly take some group or plurality, g, to be us. Thus, if I hear that Average Joe’s have won the tournament and, in a state of confusion think that my team is Average Joe’s (in fact I belong to Average Jim’s), then I may judge we have won the tournament. A we-thought will be IEM, relative to some grounds, just in case, when based on those grounds, errors of this sort cannot happen. More precisely, if I judge, based on grounds G, that we are F, my judgment is IEM if and only if the following is not possible: I know, on grounds G, that group g (or, that some group) is F, but mistakenly take us to be identical to g (or, to be that group).

Do any we-thoughts meet this condition? It might be thought, as Bratman and Schmid seem to believe, that the answer to this question is a resounding ‘no’. Consider what might be thought the easiest case, introspection, and the judgement, we want a bath. Is such a judgement susceptible to errors of misidentification? Surely it is, for whilst my judgement that I want a bath is IEM, misidentification can creep into the other component of we. Suppose that, in this case, I am employing a naming use of we, then the content of my judgement is partly determined by the intention to refer to NN. But suppose that, while I do know, of a and myself, that we want a bath, I mistakenly identify NN with a. Thus, my judgement is an error of misidentification. If even introspectively grounded we-thoughts cannot be IEM, then there might seem little hope of securing that status for we-thoughts grounded in other ways.

This little argument, however, is not compelling, and for two reasons. First, it must be noted that the judgement in question is not wholly based on introspection. Whilst my judgement that I want a bath is introspectively grounded, my judgement that NN wants a
bath is not. How could I know, via introspection alone, that someone else wants a bath? Of course, I might thereby know that I believe that NN wants a bath, but that is not the same thing. The judgement, like many we-thoughts, has mixed grounds. Second, the argument exploits a single use of we, the naming use. But the fact that the naming use of we does not support IEM judgements tells us little about the other uses. It is for these two reasons that the case of we is less straightforward than the case of I. A recognition of this complexity, however, allows us to see that some we-thoughts are IEM after all.

It is easy to see that the descriptive use of we will fail to give rise to IEM, for the reason that definite descriptions themselves so fail. A judgement, the F person wants a bath is not IEM relative to any grounds, since it may well be that I know, of a, that they want a bath and mistakenly judge a to be the F person. Given this, the judgement we are F will never be IEM when the supplementary intention is descriptive, since a misidentification may always have crept into the descriptive element. When we consider demonstrative and interlocutive uses, however, things are quite different.

It is generally accepted that some perceptually grounded demonstrative judgements are IEM. If, based on an auditory experience, I judge that is the sound of an oboe, whilst I may be wrong about its being the sound of an oboe, I cannot be wrong about it being that. That is, there can be no a such that I know, of a, that it is the sound of an oboe, whilst wrongly identifying a as that. Put another way, coming to know, via perceptual experience, that a is the sound of an oboe is sufficient for knowledge that that is the sound of an oboe. On the other hand, consider the judgement that person is playing the oboe, in which I demonstrate a. In this case, it may be that my visual experience is ultimately responsible for determining the referent of my use of that, whilst my auditory experience is responsible for my knowledge that an oboe is being played. Suppose, further, that it is not a but b whose playing I can hear. This is a case

---

22 We get a counterexample to this claim when the predicate is already packed into the description. If I judge, the person who wants a bath wants a bath, it cannot be the case that I know, of a, that they want a bath and mistakenly judge a to be the person that wants a bath. But such cases are hardly central.

23 This example is taken from Prosser 2012: 162.
of misidentification. Whilst I know that someone is playing the oboe
and, arguably, know of b that they are playing the oboe (such that, if my demonstrative thought were grounded in auditory experience
alone, I would be able to think that person is playing the oboe, a
thought which would thereby be IEM), I have mistakenly identified
that person with a.

Under what conditions will a perceptually grounded demonstra-
tive judgment be IEM? I suggest that a judgement that is F, is IEM if
the reference of the demonstrative is fixed by the experience of the
feature F that is attributed to it.24 Since the judgement that is the
sound of an oboe is grounded in an auditory experience of the
sound of an oboe which serves to fix the reference of the demon-
strative, it is IEM. Since the judgement that person is playing the
oboe is grounded in two experiences, one of which (visual) fixes the
reference of that and the other of which (auditory) is what provides
me with knowledge that someone is playing the oboe, it is not IEM.
Which judgements meet this condition is an interesting question.
Campbell (2002) argues that perceived location serves to fix the ref-
erence of visually grounded demonstrative thought. If this is correct,
then the range of visually grounded IEM judgement will be limited.
For example, the judgement that is yellow will fail to qualify.25 But,
even if Campbell is right about this, there is still plenty of scope for
IEM judgements grounded in other sense modalities, and in memo-
ry. Aside from judgements such as that is to the left (based on vision),
it is natural to suppose that the following all meet the condition: that
is soft (based on tactile experience), that smells like garlic (based on
olfactory experience), she is dancing (based on action-awareness)26,

24 As it stands, this condition is too strict to be both sufficient and necessary.
It is plausible to suppose that hearing someone utter ‘P’ is sufficient to ground
the judgement that she thinks that P, and that this judgement is IEM. But it is less
clear that the auditory experience in question is an experience of her thinking that
P, rather than of her uttering ‘P’, or something less rich still. In what follows,
I ignore this complication and speak as though such an experience is indeed an
experience of the features attributed. I make some moves to defend this view in

25 For Campbell’s argument for this claim, see Campbell 1997.

26 I discuss this case in §4.
and she stood to the left of me (based on episodic memory).

Noting this might lead us to suppose that, even if naming uses of we do not allow for judgements that are IEM, perhaps demonstrative uses do. And indeed they do. Suppose that my judgement we want a bath employs a demonstrative use of we, i.e. has its reference partly fixed by the intention to refer to her. In such a case, my judgement that she wants a bath might be based on my hearing her tell me that she wants a bath. In this situation, since the (auditory) experience that fixes the reference of the judgement is of the feature that is attributed to her, the judgement she wants a bath is IEM. Whilst I could be wrong that she wants a bath (she may have lied), I cannot be wrong by way of a misidentification. That is, it cannot be that I know, of a, that a wants a bath (or that someone wants a bath), yet mistakenly identify a as her (of course, I might misidentify a as, for example, the philosopher I met in Marrakech, but this would not be a demonstrative use). This suggests a general claim: if both components of a use of we in the thought we are F, in this case she and I, allow for IEM when distributed into the two thoughts I am F and she is F, then the we-thought allows for IEM also. That is, in the situ-

\[\text{This is not to say that in thinking a we-thought one thereby thinks two thoughts, one of which is an I-thought. This is evidently not the case with non-distributive predicates such as \textquoteleft \textquoteleft are forming a line'. Rather, the suggestion is that were one to think those thoughts, the fact that both would be IEM relative to grounds G means that the we-thought is IEM relative to grounds G. This is a sufficient condition. The case of non-distributive predicates shows, however, that it is not necessary. To see this, suppose that I am aware through a combination of vision and action-awareness that you and I are forming a line and, on this basis, judge we are forming a line. On the assumption that the use of we in this example is interlocutive, this judgement looks to be IEM. It cannot be the case that I know, on these grounds, that group g is forming a line, but mistakenly take us to be g. However, consider the distributed thoughts I am forming a line and you are forming a line. Given that \textquoteleft are forming a line' is non-distributive, each of these thoughts is false. If based on the indicated grounds it would seem that each must rest on an intermediary identification, i.e. you and I are identical to me and you and I are identical to you respectively. Since these are clearly false, the distributed beliefs look to be errors of misidentification even though the original we are forming a line is not. There is clearly much more that needs to be said about non-distributive uses of 'we'. One might attempt to formulate a necessary condition by using such formulations as 'I am playing my part in forming a line'. I will not pursue this possibility here.}\]
tion under consideration, it cannot be that I know, on grounds \( G \) (in this case a combination of introspection and auditory perception), that group \( g \) is \( F \), but mistakenly take \( us \) to be identical to \( g \).

A complication arises here due to the fact that the demonstrative use of 'we' and 'we' will always employ complex rather than simple demonstrative intentions.\(^{28}\) 'We' can only pick out animate entities, paradigmatically persons. I cannot, other than metaphorically, refer to myself and my cup of tea as 'us'. One way of ensuring that this condition is met is by requiring that the supplementary intention take a certain form. In the descriptive case, it must be the \( F \)-person(s), in the naming case 'NN' must name a person, in the demonstrative case, it must be her, him, or them. I assume that her, him, and them are complex demonstrative concepts which can be analysed as that woman, that man, and those persons respectively. Complex demonstratives such as these are sometimes taken to function quite differently to the simple demonstratives this and that.\(^{29}\)

King (2001), for example, argues against direct reference accounts and for a quantificational account of complex demonstratives.\(^{30}\) If we assume a quantificational analysis of definite descriptions, we have already seen some reason to doubt that such judgements can be IEM. If a quantificational account of complex demonstratives likens them to descriptions then we will have reason to doubt that there is a significant difference between descriptive and demonstrative uses of 'we'. Put another way, we will have reason to doubt that the

---

\(^{28}\) For a discussion of IEM and complex demonstratives, see Prosser 2012. For the view that successful demonstrative reference requires the application of sortal concepts, see Quine 1950, discussed in Campbell 2002.

\(^{29}\) It should be noted that, since I am concerned with the contents of intentions, I am concerned with the concepts her, him, and they as they feature in demonstrative thought rather than the words 'her', 'him', and 'they', as they feature in language. This is despite the fact that accounts of complex demonstratives are, for the most part, concerned with the philosophy of language rather than thought. It is, of course, a gross simplification to suppose that claims about linguistic entities apply straightforwardly to their counterparts in thought. However, in the present context, no harm is done and I shall continue to speak interchangeably of concepts and words, thoughts and utterances, mindful of the fact that this is not typically true of the authors mentioned.

\(^{30}\) Also see Stevens 2011. For the direct reference view, see Braun 2008.
The denotation of the complex demonstrative is fixed by the experience of the feature \( F \) that is attributed to it.

Such appearances are misleading, however. Any account of complex demonstratives must recognize the intuitive difference between perceptually grounded uses of complex demonstratives, such as ‘that mountain is \( F \)’ uttered while pointing to a mountain in full view, and what King calls no demonstration no speaker reference (NDNS) uses, such as ‘that guy who invented the zip (whoever it was) is \( F \)’. For while there is zero temptation to regard the latter as having their denotations fixed by an experience of the feature \( F \) attributed to it, we have already seen that there is a strong temptation to do so for at least some of the former cases. An account, quantificational or otherwise, of complex demonstratives should respect this fact and King’s own account (2001) does just that. Abstracting from the details, King sees the lexical meaning of ‘that’ as the four-place relation: _and_are uniquely _in an object \( x \) and \( x \) is _ (King 2001: 43). Consider an utterance of ‘that \( G \) is \( F \)’. In such a case the first and fourth argument places are saturated as follows: being \( G \) and _ are uniquely _ in an object \( x \) and \( x \) is \( F \). With respect to the other two places, however, matters will vary depending on the nature of the case. The second place is saturated by a property determined by the speaker’s intentions. If the speaker intends to refer to a perceived or recalled object, as with the mountain example above, the property will be being the object of the perceptual (or mnemonic) intention in question or, more simply, being identical to \( b \) (assuming that \( b \) is the object of the perceptual intention). In such cases, the third place is saturated by being jointly instantiated in \( w, t \). Thus, we get being \( G \) and being identical to \( b \) are uniquely jointly instantiated in \( w, t \) in an object \( x \) and \( x \) is \( F \). The important point here is that this account preserves, via the perceptual (or mnemonic) intention, the possibility that the denotation of the complex demonstrative is fixed by the perceptual (or mnemonic) experience of the feature \( F \) that is attributed to it. Thus, King’s quantificational account of complex demonstratives is no barrier to the claim that complex demonstrative judgements can be IEM.

---

31 For non-perceptual cases, the property will be the complex of properties denoted by the relevant descriptive intention (e.g. being the inventor of the zip).

32 I may, of course, mistake a man for a woman and so think \( \text{she is } G \) when I
The result is that we-thought that employs the demonstrative use of we can give rise to IEM. We have already seen that naming and descriptive uses do not, for the reason that proper names and definite descriptions do not give rise to the phenomenon. What about the interlocutive use? Plausibly, ‘you’ is a term that can give rise to IEM. If, to a conversational partner, I utter ‘you have gravy on your tie’, it cannot be the case that I know, of a, that they have gravy on their tie yet misidentify a as you. For my use of ‘you’ is addressed to the person whom I know to have gravy on their tie. This is the case even if I fail to realise that I am looking in a mirror and a is myself. In such a case I have referred to myself as ‘you’. For some of us, this is not even that unusual. Of course, b may wrongly suppose that I am addressing them rather than a, but that is an error on their part, not mine. One way in which I might go wrong is if my use of ‘you’ is controlled by something other than incoming perceptual information. If, during a telephone conversation with b, I hear, on the other end of the line, someone trying to control three noisy children, I might silently judge you have your hands full. And, in this case, it is possible that I do know, of b, that they have their hands full, but wrongly judge b to be a—in fact there is a crossed line. If, in such a situation, my use of you is (in imagination) addressed to a, rather than to whoever I know to have their hands full, then we have a case of misidentification. But making this case explicit only serves to highlight that there is a use of you that is controlled by incoming perceptual information, rather than prior beliefs, conversation, etc., and so a use of you that allows for IEM. If this is right, and going by the above principle that when both components of a use of we allow for IEM, then we would expect the we-thought to be IEM also, we can see that there ought to be cases where the judgement we are F, in which the reference of we is partly grounded in an intention to refer to you, is IEM. As an example, consider the judgement to which an utterance of ‘we are having a conversation’ gives voice. Quite plausibly, it cannot be the case that I know, on grounds G (in this

should have thought he is G. This, however, is subtly different kind of error, one that Prosser (2012) calls ‘error though misclassification’. What the relation is between errors of misclassification and errors of misidentification, is a complex question to be treated elsewhere.
that group $g$ is having a conversation, but mistakenly take us, in this case you and I, to be identical to $g$. Interlocutive we-thought can, like perceptually grounded demonstrative we-thought, be IEM.

4 The grounds of we-thought

In the case of I, there is significant controversy over both the source of IEM, i.e. what explains the phenomenon, and the forms of experience that ground judgements that are IEM. What the forgoing discussion has made clear is that the status of we-thought with respect to IEM is parasitic on that of its components. If a we-thought employs either the demonstrative or interlocutive use of we, then it may be IEM. If it employs either the naming or descriptive uses, then it may not. Consequently, we can pass the buck on the question of what it is that explains IEM, allowing the present investigation to help itself to whatever turns out to be the correct explanation of IEM relative to I, this, and you. We might be tempted to make a similar move with respect to the question of the forms of experience that ground IEM we-thought. The quick answer is simply that those we-thoughts that are IEM will be those whose components, were they separated out in individual thoughts, would themselves be IEM. Whilst the quick answer is correct, it is liable to appear too quick, and it does obscure some important features of the first-person plural perspective. It is worth, then, elaborating with some considerations concerning the variety of forms of experience. The focus will be on action-awareness and episodic memory, followed by some brief remarks on egocentric perception, bodily-awareness, and introspection.

Action-awareness is an awareness of what one is currently doing. I now know that I am typing, for example, but not because I can see, or even feel from the inside, the movement of my hands. My actions are, as Anscombe memorably put it, ‘known without observation’ (Anscombe 1975). Such awareness gives rise to I-thoughts that are immune to error. If, while dancing, I judge I am dancing, it cannot be that I know, via action-awareness, that a (or that someone) is dancing, but mistakenly take a to be myself (O’Brien 2007, 2012). What of the plural case? If Menaha is dancing with Yi Ling and judges we are dancing, where the supplementary intention employs the
demonstrative she, is that judgement IEM? First we must ask what the grounds are for the judgement. Is it action-awareness? Menaha can know what she is doing via action-awareness, but can she know what she and Yi Ling are doing? If they are dancing close enough, perhaps she can. For action-awareness is surely closely bound up with the sense of touch through which Menaha is unquestionably aware of Yi Ling. This is not to say that action-awareness necessarily depends on the sense of touch. It doesn’t. It is to say rather that, in a typical case, my knowledge of what I am doing, with whom I am doing it, and with what, will depend on a combination of action awareness and the sense of touch (and bodily awareness). And it does so in such a way that it is difficult, if indeed possible, to distinguish the contribution made by each. Compare my knowledge, not only that I am holding your hand and that you are holding mine, but that we are holding hands. If action-awareness, perhaps supplemented in these ways, can ground an awareness of joint actions, and the subject of action awareness plurally self-ascribes a joint-action on its basis, then the result will be a judgement that is IEM. This will be so even if one insists that it is the sense of touch alone that grounds the demonstrative she, making it a case of mixed grounds.\(^{33}\) For the sense of touch can surely ground IEM demonstrative thought. It seems, then, that in such a case it cannot be that Menaha knows, via action awareness (or, action-awareness+touch), that group \(g\) is dancing, but misidentify \(g\) as us (i.e. her and me).

This claim might be challenged in a number of ways. I will consider three cases: quasi-action-awareness, the switcheroo, and the empty case. Quasi-action-awareness is a hypothetical form of experience, qualitatively indiscriminable from action-awareness but in which I am aware not of my own actions but of those of someone else.\(^ {34}\) For present purposes we might extend this to consider quasi-joint-action-awareness. Suppose that Menaha is somehow (by

\(^{33}\) Such an insistence might be based on the argument in Blomberg 2018 to the effect that action awareness could be an awareness of one’s intentional joint actions only if one had, \textit{per impossibile}, a non-observational knowledge of one’s partner’s intentions.

\(^{34}\) This is modelled, of course, on quasi-memory, which was first introduced by Shoemaker (1970).
magic or weird science) aware not of her and Yi Ling’s joint actions, but of the joint actions of Magic Menaha and Magic Yi Ling. In this case, it might be argued, the possibility of error is made for: Menaha might know, of group g (Magic Menaha and Magic Yi Ling), that they are dancing and mistakenly think that g is us (i.e. her and me). Error through misidentification!

Quasi-sensory modalities, including quasi-action-awareness, and their significance for IEM have been discussed at length elsewhere. Concerning this case, I limit myself to the observation that the joint aspect adds nothing, the issue really coming down to whether quasi-action-awareness is coherent and, if so, whether it puts one in a position to entertain a de re thought about its objects. Why is the joint aspect irrelevant? Notice that the use of we in Menaha’s thought is demonstrative (i.e. her + me). But who is the referent of ‘her’ here? Surely not Yi Ling! For the reference of the demonstrative is supposed to be guided by the action-awareness (in this case, the quasi-action-awareness), so presumably the her in her thought picks out Magic Yi Ling if it picks out anyone at all. The misidentification, then, is not between g (Magic Menaha and Magic Yi Ling) and h (Menaha and Yi Ling), but rather between g (Magic Menaha and Magic Yi Ling) and i (Menaha and Magic Yi Ling). This means that the error is to be found in the first-person singular component of we; she has misidentified Magic Menaha as herself. The joint aspect adds nothing. If quasi-action-awareness shows this class of we-thoughts not to be IEM, it is because it shows the analogous class of I-thoughts not to be IEM. So, in this respect at least, we-thought and I-thought stand or fall together, which is all that I want to claim; the plural

35 Aside from Shoemaker 1970, see, for example, O’Brien 2007, and the papers collected in Prosser and Recanati 2012.

36 The formulation here concerns de re misidentification. The question of whether quasi-capacities to sustain the thought that someone is F, and so generate the possibility of misidentification on the alternative formulation is one that need not concern us here. I discuss the two formulations of IEM in my (2006), in which I argue that the de re formulation is of more philosophical interest. The classic statement of scepticism about the capacity of quasi-faculties to sustain de re thought is Evans 1982. Also see McDowell 1997. Pryor 1999 includes an important critical discussion of Evans. Also, see the distinction between transparent and non-transparent IEM in O’Brien 2007.
first-person perspective closely mirrors the singular case.

A second, more realistic, hard case is the switcheroo: In the dark, Menaha believes herself to be dancing with Yi Ling but, in fact, Yi Ling has wandered off and she is dancing with Teeba. Here, Menaha knows, of group \( g \) (Menaha and Teeba), that they are dancing, but mistakenly identifies \( g \) with \( \mathfrak{us} \) (Menaha and Yi Ling). Thus we have an error of misidentification when Menaha thinks we are dancing. This is a more interesting case, for our purposes, since in leaving the \( I \) component of \( \mathfrak{we} \) untouched, it threatens to drive a wedge between the IEM of action-awareness-grounded I-thoughts and the IEM of action-awareness-grounded we-thoughts. It is, however, reasonably easy to see what has gone wrong. For if Menaha’s we-thought is genuinely demonstrative it won’t pick out the group consisting of her and Yi Ling, but rather the group consisting of her and Teeba. There is, then, no gap between the group of which she is aware via action-awareness and the group that she picks out with her demonstrative use of \( \mathfrak{we} \). Of course, she may have Yi Ling in mind and so go on to infer that Yi Ling is dancing well. But this doesn’t show that the we-thought itself involves misidentification, only that it can be the source of further error. Perhaps it will be argued that Menaha’s conviction that she is dancing with Yi Ling is sufficient to show that her use of \( \mathfrak{we} \) really does pick out herself and Yi Ling. But if so it is not a demonstrative use grounded in action-awareness but, if it is to be interpreted as a we-thought at all, it is some other kind, presumably naming.\(^{37}\)

The switcheroo case, it seems, does not undermine the claim that action-awareness-grounded we-thoughts can be IEM.

Finally, the empty case: Menaha thinks that she is dancing with Yi Ling but, in fact, she has drifted off and is dancing alone. Whatever we say about it, it is not a case of misidentification since there is no dancing group, \( g \), of which Menaha might entertain the relevant \( \text{de re} \) thought. The purpose of mentioning the empty case here is that it, arguably, does drive a wedge between the singular and plural

\(^{37}\) This might seem to jar with the claim that intentions play a crucial role in demonstrative reference. But this is an illusion. If, on seeing Charlie, I utter ‘He is crazy’, the fact that I wrongly believe myself to be seeing Donald does not prevent my thought from referring to Charlie. That is, the relevant intention is a ‘directing intention’, in Kaplan’s (1989a) sense.
first-person perspectives. For a widely accepted feature of the first-

person perspective, singular, is that the I-thoughts central to it are
immune to reference failure.\textsuperscript{18} In thinking an I-thought I cannot fail
to be thinking about myself. But the empty case suggests that this is
not so with the first-person plural perspective. In §3 I proposed that
the character of ‘we’ is the intended group or plurality of animate entities
of which the producer of this token is a member. This suggests that, since
I am not a group or plurality, I cannot refer to myself as ‘we’ (again,
leaving the majestic plural aside). If, unbeknownst to him, everyone but Henry V had left the battlefield, and his ‘we’ is a genuinely
demonstrative use, then it is plausible to suppose that his utterance
of ‘we band of brothers’, will fail to refer. There is no demonstrable
group of which Henry is a member. If this is right, there is a way in
which we-thinking, but not I-thinking, can go astray.\textsuperscript{39} But it is not
through misidentification.\textsuperscript{40}

With this lengthy discussion of action-awareness in view, we can
move much more quickly through the other forms of experience on
our list. Thus, what of episodic memory? Memory-based judgements
are often considered to be IEM. If I judge, based on an apparent rec-

ollection\textit{ from within}, that I ate toast for breakfast, whilst I might be
mistaken (in fact I had a bagel), I cannot be mistaken in the following
way: I know, via episodic memory, that a had toast for breakfast and
mistakenly take a to be myself. If I remember, from within, a’s eating
toast, this is sufficient for me to know that I ate toast. Now consider
the corresponding plural case: Gatsby, remembering last night’s par-

ty, thinks we had fun. Perhaps he is wrong that anyone had fun. But
the following is not possible: he knows, of group \( g \), that they had fun
but mistakenly takes \( g \) to be \( us \). Knowing, through episodic memory
\textit{ from within}, that \( g \) was \( F \) is sufficient for knowledge that \( we \) were \( F \).

\textsuperscript{18} Widely, but not universally, accepted. Evans (1982) claims that I-thoughts
can fail to refer. Anscombe (1975) claims that none refer.

\textsuperscript{19} I take it that Nunberg’s (1993) inclusion of plurality in the classificatory
component of ‘we’ entails that Henry V’s use of ‘we’ fails to refer. Both Val-
lée (1996) and Korta (2016) are slightly less clear on this question but it seems
that, in both cases, their considered view is that, in such cases, ‘we’ refers to the
speaker alone.

\textsuperscript{40} Searle (1990: 408) mentions such cases in the context of collective action.
Consider the problem cases: quasi-memory, switcheroo, and the empty case. I quasi-remember an event if my apparent memory of it is in fact derived from the personal history of another. If Gatsby is, in fact, undergoing a quasi-memory derived from someone else’s partying, would we not have a case of misidentification? Gatsby would know, of group \( g \), that they had fun, but mistakenly take \( g \) to be us. To this we can make the same response as we did in the case of action-awareness. First, if the use of we really is demonstrative then its demonstrative component will successfully pick out the members of \( g \) (other than the person from whom the quasi-memory in fact derives). The source of the error, then, is in the I component. Thus, if quasi-memory undermines the claim that memory-based I-thought is IEM, it also undermines the claim that memory-based we-thought is IEM. If it does not, if for example quasi-memory is insufficient to allow for the relevant de re thought of \( g \), then it does not. Once more, no wedge is driven between I-thought and we-thought with respect to its IEM status.

The memory switcheroo: Gatsby thinks that he is remembering being at the party with Daisy but, in fact, it was Jordan. In thinking we had fun, is Gatsby making an error of misidentification? Yes, if this use of we is a naming use picking out himself and Daisy. But we are interested in the demonstrative use and, in that case, no misidentification has occurred since Gatsby’s use of we picks out himself and Jordan.

The empty memory case: Gatsby was actually alone, the others he seems to remember being shadows of his imagination. As with the case of action-awareness, there is no misidentification here since there is no group, \( g \), of which Gatsby has knowledge that they had fun. There is, perhaps, reference failure, but that is all.

This same pattern will be repeated with other forms of experientially grounded we-thoughts. Egocentric perception: if Yi Ling, standing next to Menaha, utters ‘we are facing the mountain’, then as long as her judgement is visually grounded in the ordinary way, it cannot be the case that she knows, of group \( g \), that they are facing the mountain but mistakenly thinks that \( g \) is us (i.e. her and me). Bodily-awareness: if Yi Ling, feeling her own and seeing Menaha’s crossed legs, thinks we have crossed legs, then it cannot be that she knows, of group \( g \), that they have crossed legs but mistakenly thinks
that \( g \) is us (i.e. her and me). Introspection: if Yi Ling judges both Menaha and herself to want a bath, based on the appropriate combination of introspection and auditory perception, her judgement \textit{we want a bath} is IEM, since it cannot be that she knows, of group \( g \), that they want a bath but mistakenly thinks that \( g \) is us (i.e. her and me). We-thoughts are IEM just in case the two components (I and her, him, them, or you) would themselves support IEM judgement.

One final objection: the above considerations, far from supporting the IEM of certain cases of we-thought, in fact serve to undermine the IEM of certain cases of I-thought. In some of the cases discussed, for example action-awareness and episodic memory, both components are grounded in the same experiential modality. It is Menaha’s action-awareness that grounds her knowledge both of her own dancing and that of Yi Ling. It is Gatsby’s memory that grounds his knowledge both of his own and Daisy’s having had fun. But doesn’t this mean that modalities for which this is possible will fail to rule out misidentification in the case of singular first-person judgements? Action-awareness can give me information not only about my own actions, but also about yours; episodic memory can give me information not only about my own past, but also about yours (one might make similar claims with respect to bodily-awareness and egocentric perception). Thus, Gatsby can make the memory-based judgement \textit{I had fun} and be mistaken for the reason that the person that he recalls having fun was not himself but Daisy.

The answer to this worry is straightforward but tells us something significant about the first-person plural perspective. When introducing the claim that memory-based I-thoughts are IEM it was crucial to include the phrase ‘\textit{from the inside}’. There is all the difference in the world between the way in which Gatsby remembers his own past and the way in which he remembers that of Daisy. Insofar as his episodic memory is accurate, he will remember his own past \textit{from the inside} and Daisy’s \textit{from the outside}. Memory-based I-thoughts are IEM only if grounded in the memories representing this internal perspective. The same, of course, is true of the other modalities mentioned in the previous paragraph. For example, whilst it may be true that action-awareness can give us information of both our own and others’ actions, it does each of these things in different ways. One experiences one’s own actions \textit{from within} and the actions of others \textit{from without}. 
But what of joint actions? Am I not within joint actions of which I am an agent? Yes, I do experience the group’s actions from within, but only in virtue of experiencing those actions from within a member of the group, i.e. myself. The first-person perspective involves experience from within, the first-person plural perspective involves experience from within in virtue of involving experience from within an element of a whole that extends beyond one’s own boundaries.

5 Conclusion

There are uses of we that support the claim that we-thoughts can be immune to error through misidentification. The sorts of experience that can ground IEM we-thought mirror those that can ground IEM I-thought. In this respect, there is such a thing as the first-person plural perspective that parallels the first-person singular perspective. If the first-person perspective locates us within the world, then the first-person plural perspective locates us within a group within the world.41

Joel Smith
Department of Philosophy
School of Social Sciences
University of Manchester
Oxford Road, Manchester
M13 9PL, UK
joel.smith@manchester.ac.uk

References


41 I have benefitted greatly from discussions of this material at seminars in both Manchester and Nottingham. Thanks also to Olle Blomberg, Graham Stevens, Tom Smith, and Ann Whittle who read an earlier version of the paper, each providing helpful comments.
New York: Oxford University Press.


Prosser, Simon; and François Recanati (eds). 2012. *Immunity to Error Through...*


